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Gyula Klima Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy - старонка 40

Entia rationis in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction", to appear in Synthese, 1991. and "‘Debeo tibi equum': A Reconstruction of the Theoretical Framework of Buridan's Treatment of the Sophisma", to appear in: S. Read (ed.): Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Mediaeval Logic and Semantics.

198 Cf.: "Comme on le sait, Occam pense qu'il est toujours possible de donner une definitio quid nominis des termes connotatifs (SL III-2, 28. p.556. III-3, 26. pp.689-691.) La position de Buridan est différente. ... Buridan réserve explicitement la definitio exprimens quid nominis aux termes vocaux simples auxquels corresponde un terme mental complexe. (Soph. I. concl.11.; Summulae VIII, 2, f. 100ra.) Le problème de savoir si ‘res alba' et ‘nasus cavus' sont les orationes dicentes quid nominis respectivement de ‘album' et de ‘simum' s'étant posé, Buridan répond conditionaliter: si à ‘album' correspond dans la pensée un concept complexe, ‘res alba' sera sa definitio dicens quid nominis (il en est de même pour ‘simum' et ‘nasus cavus'); si au contraire, à ‘album' et à ‘simum' ‘correspondent in mente conceptus incomplexi quibus confuse et indistincte substantiam et albedinem, vel nasum et simitatem concipimus, et non substantiam uno conceptu et albedinem alio, nec nasum uno conceptu et simitatem alio, tunc istae definitiones non sunt dicentes quid nominis sed quid rei'. (Summulae VIII.2. 102va; cf. Meta VII, 5.)" A. Maierù: "Significatio et Connotatio chez Buridan", in: J. Pinborg (ed.): The Logic of John Buridan, Copenhagen, 1976. pp.110-111. For the niceties of the differences between Ockham's and Buridan's ontological views see C. Normore: "Buridan's Ontology", in: J. Bogen-J.E. McGuire: How Things Are, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1985.

199 Cf.: "... Non enim sequitur: ‘Signum in actu est, ergo res significata est' quia non entia possunt significari per voces sicut et entia, nisi velimus dicere quod esse quod necessario requiruitur ad significatum non est nisi apud intellectum vel imaginationem." Roger Bacon: De Signis, (ed. K.M. Fredborg-L. Nielsen-J. Pinborg), Traditio, 34(1978), pp.75-136. p.82.

200 Cf.: "dico quod non sunt talia esse obiectiva, quae non sunt nec possunt esse entia realia; nec est unus parvus mundus alius entium obiectivorum; sed illud quod nulla res est, omnino nihil est ..." Quodl. III.q.4. pp.218-219. Cf. also the discussion of the problem by E. Karger: "Would Ockham Have Shaved Wyman's Beard?", in: H.A.G. Braakhuis-C.H. Kneepkens-L.M. de Rijk (eds.): English Logic and Semantics, Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1981.

201 For a formal treatment of quantification over and reference to nonexistents applying the mediaeval idea of ampliation, see "Existence, Quantification and the Mediaeval Theory of Ampliation" in my Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modern, Budapest, 1988. In the system presented there existence is simply denied to any objects of reference that do not actually exist.

202 Cf.: "Here is a recipe for ontology. First divide the expressions of one's language into those which purport to pick things out and those which don't. Then see whether some of those which purport to pick things out can be defined in terms of others. Finally admit in your ontology whatever an undefinable term purports to pick out. This scheme expresses (though vaguely and incompletely) one of the central intuitions behind many ontological programmes. What is admitted by an ontologist operating within this framework will depend, of course, upon how he or she divides expressions, on what resources of definition are available, and, perhaps, on pressures from other theories." C. Normore: "Buridan's Ontology", in: J. Bogen-J.E. McGuire: How Things Are, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1985. p.189.

203 For detailed account and ample references see Adams, op. cit. vol. I. part 3, cc.13-14.

204 I was pleased to learn that John Haldane identified the same kind of paradigm-shift in Ockham's epistemology in his: "Mind/World Identity and the Anti-realist Challenge", forthcoming in: J. Haldane-C. Wright: Realism, Reason and Projection, Oxford University Press, 1991.

205 For a suggestion concerning the semantics of relative identity, see n.5. of "On Being and Essence in Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science", in my Ars Artium, also in S. Knuuttila (et. al. eds.): Knowledge and the Sciences in Mediaeval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Mediaeval Philosophy Vol. II., Helsinki, 1990. The idea is that if we adopt the inherence theory of predication and the corresponding theory of signification, then we may say that ‘a is the same F as b' is true iff SGT(F)(a)=SGT(F)(b), which certainly may hold good even if a and b are numerically distinct entities. (Where on the right-hand side of the equivalence a and b are items of the universe of discourse that the object-language names ‘a' and ‘b' refer to.)

206 Note here that it also follows that CON(m)(T1)(u)=CON(m)(T2)(u) iff SGT(T1)(u)=SGT(T2)(u), for any u, that is two terms signify the same things, i.e., they are synonymous, iff they are subordinated to the same concept. The point is that these follow from our characterisation of concepts by means of model-theoretical functions, and hence from the standard identity conditions for functions. For a detailed formal account see again the Appendix of my "Understanding Matters from a Logical Angle" and "‘Socrates est species': Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas' Treatment of a Paralogism", in: G. Klima: Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modern, Budapest, 1988, also to appear in K. Jacobi (ed.): Acts of the 8th European Symposium of Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, Munich, Philosophia Verlag, 1990.

207 Indeed, the conclusion of this view of concepts, that qualities of the mind that are concepts are only contingently concepts, i.e. qualities that represent external objects to a mind, is explicitly stated by Pierre d'Ailly: "illa qualitas que est conceptus, licet naturaliter sit conceptus, non tamen necessario est conceptus, quare conceptus potest non esse conceptus". See Pierre d'Ailly: Conceptus, text edited in: L. Kaczmarek: Modi Significandi und Ihre Destruktionen, Munster, 1980, (contaning editions of Pierre d'Ailly: Destructiones Modorum Significandi and Conceptus), p.92. Cf. also pp.82. and 91-92.

208 "... Omnis res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta potest per divinam potentiam existere alia re absoluta destructa. Sed visio intuitiva tam sensitiva quam intellectiva est res absoluta distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso, sicut si videam intuitive stellam existentem in celo, ista visio intuitiva, sive sit sensitiva sive intuitiva, distinguitur loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso. Ergo ista visio potest manere stella destructa." A. Pelzer: "Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés, en Avignon, en 1326", Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 1922, pp.240-70. Quoted by E.A. Moody: "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt", in: Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science and Logic, UC Press, Berkeley-LA-London, 1975. p.134.

209 "Sed forsan dicetis, prout mihi videtur, volebatis innuere in quadam disputatione apud Predicatores, quod, licet ex visione non possit inferri obiectum visum esse, quando visio ponitur in esse a causa supernaturali vel conservatur ab ipsa, tamen quando posita est in esse a causis naturalibus precise, concurrente influentia generali primi agentis, tunc potest inferri. Contra. Quando ex aliquo antecedente, si esset positum ab aliquo agente, non poterit inferri consequentia formali et evidenti aliquod consequens: nec ex illo antecedente poterit inferri illud consequens, a quocunque fuerit positum in esse." ibid. p.135.

210 Two outstanding examples are Moody and Adams in their opp. cit.

211 "Et patet quod impossibile est rem communem pluribus rebus extra habere illud esse secundum, nisi tantum dum fuerit in anima secundum esse spirituale vel intentionale in suo signo. Et sic intelliguntur quotquot dicta Commentatoris et philosophorum loquentium de ista materia. Metaphysici tamen sciunt quod natura communis prius naturaliter intelligitur a Deo ut communicata multis suppositis quam in effectu communicatur eisdem. Et sic universalitas vel veritas metaphysica non dependet ab intellectu creato, cum praecedit ipsum, sed dependet ab intellectu increato. Quae - ex aeterna notitia intellectuali - producit omnia in effectu! Et ignorantia huius sensus fecit Ockham et multos alios doctores signorum ex infirmitate intellectus declinare ab universali reali." John Wyclif: Tractatus de Universalibus, (ed. I.J. Mueller), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985. c.2. p.65.

212 No wonder Buridan, the great systematiser and developer of Ockham's doctrine of concepts, in his refutations of Nicholas of Autrecourt's scepticism, resorted to the notion of ex suppositione necessity and to a probabilistic interpretation of certainty in natural science. Cf. Moody, op. cit.

213 C. Wright: "On Putnam's Proof That We Are Not Brains-In-A-Vat", for the Gifford Conference on the philosophy of Hilary Putnam, held at St. Andrews Nov.23-26, 1990. draft, p.21. I owe thanks to Crispin Wright for his kindly supplying me with a copy of this particularly inspiring paper even before its final completion.

214 Note here that by calling this the "older model" I by no means wish to imply that the other model, what I called "the efficient causality model", was entirely Ockham's invention. In fact, I suspect that what partly motivated Plato's introduction of what I called "the formal causality model" was the scepticism of Protagoras and other sophists, formulated in an efficient causality framework. But the details of this ancient story are beyond the scope of this paper.

215 This paper was written during my stay in St. Andrews, Scotland, as Gifford Visiting Fellow of the Department of Logic and Metaphysics of the University of St. Andrews in the second half of 1990. An earlier version was presented and discussed there at a meeting of the Philosophy Club, followed by further inspiring discussions with John Haldane and Stephen Read. I would like to thank the University of St. Andrews for the wonderful time we spent there with my family, for the kindness and hospitality we received from everyone we met during our whole visit. I owe special thanks, however, to Stephen Read, chairman of the Department, for having arranged this visit in the first place, for the fruitful scholarly discussions and for kindly correcting whatever I committed in my paper against the English language.

216 One of course has to be very cautious when applying such an expression, so much involved in scholarly debate. In the rest of this paper I wish to use it in a very restricted, technical sense, referring to a particular way of constructing semantic theory, sharply distinguishable from Ockham's and his followers' way (both to be described later). What I think may justify such a usage is the clear connection of these ways of doing semantics with the ways broader philosophical, theological and methodological issues were treated in the two great trends getting separated later in mediaeval thought. Indeed, this paper may perhaps serve as a modest contribution to the characterisation of the two viae from the point of view of the connections between semantics and ontology. As to the debates concerning the proper characterisation of via antiqua vs. via moderna see e.g. Moore (1989).

217 To be sure, by presenting Aquinas' views as representative of what I call "via antiqua semantics" I do not wish to deny the immense variety of semantic views in mediaeval philosophy even before Ockham. I take Aquinas' views typical, however, as contrasted with Ockham's, precisely in those of their features which rendered the via antiqua framework unacceptable for Ockham.

218 The notorious lack of the use/mention distinction in St. Thomas' texts renders their translation sometimes extremely difficult, and at some places faithfulness inevitably results at least in clumsiness of style, if not in confusion. With due apologies for clumsiness I only hope that the subsequent discussion will at least help dispel confusion. Translations in this paper if not otherwise indicated are mine. Texts from St. Thomas translated here are from Aquinas (1980). References to Aquinas's single works are by their standard abbreviations and divisions.

219 2SN 34.1.1. Cf. 1SN 19.5.1.ad1., 33.1.1.ad1.; 2SN 37.1.2.ad1. & ad3.; De Ente 1.; De Pot 7.2.ad1.; De Malo 1.1.ad19.; Quodl 9.2.2.; In Meta 4.1., 5.9., 6.2., 6.4., 9.11., 11.8.; ST1 3.4.ad2., 16.3.ad2.; 48.2.ad2.; ST1-2 36.1.; ScG 1.12., 1.58., 3.9. Cf. also Cajetan (1964, 1590) c.1.; C. Alamannus (1888) Tom.1. sect. II. 5. 1.; Schmidt (1966) Part II. ch. 4. and Part III. ch. 8.

220 In Meta 5.9.n.896.

221 To help settle these worries let me refer the reader to Klima (1988b). For more on Frege's "ambiguity thesis" in a historical perspective see Knuuttila et al. (1986).

222 Cf. "Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc, sive in affirmando sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum non esse album." In Meta 5.9.n.895.

223 Concerning the inherence theory in general, as opposed to the iden­tity theory see L. M. de Rijk's Introduction to Abaelard (1956, pp. 37-38) and Henry (1972, pp. 55-56). Concerning St. Thomas's inherence theory in particular see H. Weidemann (1986) and Schmidt (1966).

224 Translation is from Cajetan (1964, pp. 64-65), which I slightly modified at some points on the basis of Cajetan (1590, pp. 299-300).

225 For a formal reconstruction and more detailed discussion of St. Thomas's distinction see Klima (1990).

226 "Et adverte hic diligenter quod illa maxima Aristotelis hic posita: `ab eo quod res est vel non est oratio dicitur vera vel falsa', non intelligit de re quae est subiectum aut praedicatum ora­tionis, sed de re significata per ipsam orationem, verbi gratia: cum dicitur homo est albus, non ideo est vera ista quia homo vel album sit, sed ideo, quia hominem esse album est: hoc enim est significatum per illam orationem." Caietan (1939, p. 87). Cf. St. Thomas: in Peri I.9. Of course, by `res quae est subiectum or praedicatum orationis' Cajetan understands the things signified by the corresponding terms of the proposition, hence my additions in the translation. For an excellent modern discussion of Aristotle's relevant texts see Matthen (1983).

227 I would tentatively identify the significate of a proposition as the enuntiabile expressed by the proposition, expressly called by St. Thomas an ens rationis in 1SN 41.1.5. I say "tentatively", because of St. Thomas's tendency to use the term 2010-07-19 18:44 Читать похожую статью
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